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IMPLEMENTATION AND MODIFICATION OF TITLE 
IX STANDARDS: 
THE EVOLUTION OF ATHLETICS POLICY 
Robert R. Hunt* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The protracted litigation in Cohen v. Brown University, 1 in 
which a series of federal courts construed the requirements of 
Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 19722 in the context 
of athletic programming, culminated in a major victory for 
women athletes and, conversely has given colleges and univer-
sities greater reason to reflect upon their efforts to secure an 
NCAA championship. In Cohen, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit described equal opportunity for men and 
women to participate as the "core of Title IX's purpose" and 
applied a three-part test to ascertain the university's progress 
towards that goal.3 The case concluded with the court's condem-
nation of Brown's efforts (though the University was years 
ahead of its peers in providing opportunities for female student-
athletes) and the Supreme Court's refusal to hear Brown's the 
University's appeal. Currently therefore, colleges and universi-
ties are faced with the judicial endorsement of Title IX policy 
which arguably requires institutions to take the steps 
* Mr. Hunt received his J.D. and his Ph.D. in Higher Education 
Administration from the University of Utah. This paper is an extract of his doctoral 
dissertation entitled Implementation and the Expansion of the Mandate: A History 
and Critical Legal Analysis of Twenty-five Years of Title IX Athletic Policy 
Development (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Utah) (on file with 
author). 
1. The litigation generated four independent rulings: Cohen v. Brown Univ. 
(Cohen [), 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), aff'd (Cohen In 991 F.2d 888 (1'' Cir. 
1993), aff'd on remand, (Cohen lin 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995), aff'd (Cohen /V) 
101 F.3d. 155 (1" Cir. 1996) and cert. denied 117 S. Ct 1469 (1997). 
2. Title IX provides that: "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis 
of sex, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. 
§§ 1681-1688. 
3. Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 897. 
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necessary to provide athletic opportunities to men and women 
on a proportionately equal basis. 
This depiction is premised on the observation that the 
three-part analysis applied in Cohen, or the "effective accommo-
dation" analysis,4 can only be satisfied by achieving the statisti-
cal relationship between participation and enrollment known as 
"substantial proportionality" which Cohen and other courts 
have acknowledged as a "safe harbor" from legal challenge. 5 In 
application, this means that to avoid the imposition of a pre-
sumption of noncompliance, institutions are obliged to extend 
greater opportunities to women via preferential program 
expansion-notwithstanding conflicts with the underlying stat-
ute and equal protection doctrine. 6 It is on this basis that the 
requirements have been characterized in some corners as "an 
affirmative action, quota-based scheme."7 
Title IX and its legislative history8 explicitly discourage the 
use of preferences. Section 1681(b) ofthe statute, in particular, 
provides that: 
Nothing contained in ... this section shall be interpreted to 
require any educational institution to grant preferential or 
disparate treatment to members of one sex on account of an 
imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or 
percentage of persons of that sex participating in or receiving 
the benefits of any federally supported program or activity in 
comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of 
that sex in any community, state, section or other area. 9 
4. The analysis, first outlined by the Department of Education's Office for Civil 
Rights (OCR) in its 1979 "Policy Interpretation" allows institutions to demonstrate 
compliance in one of three ways: 1) substantial proportionality between the ratio of 
men and women in the athletics program and the ratio of male to female 
undergraduates; 2) by demonstrating a history and continuing practice of program 
expansion for the underrepresented sex; or 3) by demonstrating that the existing 
program "fully and effectively" accommodates the interests and abilities of the 
underrepresented sex. See 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979). 
5. See id. 
6. See William E. Thro & Brian A. Snow, The Conflict Between the Equal 
Protection Clause and Cohen v. Brown University, 123 EDUC. L. REP. 1013, 1016 
(1998) (arguing that the great victory for women in Cohen was achieved by sacrificing 
the constitutional value that no one should be treated differently on the basis of 
gender). 
7. Cohen N, 101 F.3d 155 (1'1 Cir. 1996) (Torruella, J., dissenting). 
8. Hearings before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Educ. of the Comm. on 
Educ. and Labor, 941h Cong. (1975). 
9. 20 U.S.C. §1681(b) (1998). 
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By affirming the use of preferences to address statistical dis-
parities in athletic participation that may reflect genuine differ-
ences in athletic interests rather than discrimination, in short, 
Cohen can be viewed as an endorsement of a much broader view 
of Title IX than the statute, or its history may warrant. 
The foregoing characterization of Cohen, of course, involves 
many complex issues which are not only difficult to summarize, 
but challenge traditional distinctions between matters of law 
and public policy. From a public policy perspective, moreover, 
Cohen is in many respects a reasonable extension of Title IX's 
underlying purpose of ending sex discrimination in education 
and an appropriate (and perhaps overdue) response to the defi-
ance of colleges and universities toward the regulation. Legally 
speaking, on the other hand, the decision can be interpreted as 
greater than the sum of Title IX's legislatively authorized parts. 
The objective of this Article is to examine Cohen as an evo-
lution of Title IX standards with the hope of better understand-
ing both the Title IX experience and the effect of that unique, 
post-legislative process known as "implementation" on the de-
velopment of law and policy. Part II of this Article sets forth the 
conceptual framework which will guide this examination. Part 
III recounts the legal and political climate leading up to the 
adoption of Title IX. Part IV describes the modification of stan-
dards over the 25 years since the statute's enactment. Part V 
discusses the prevailing views of the current regulatory frame-
work. Finally, Part VI concludes that colleges and universities 
face a much more invasive type of regulation than anticipated 
at the time of the statute's creation. 
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The conceptual framework chosen for this Article focuses on 
the delicate process of implementing governmental mandates 
like Title IX, which essentially use the legal system to advance 
substantive social objectives. It is attentive, in particular, to the 
pressures brought to bear on the legal system when confronted 
with politically charged social initiatives and when asked to 
resolve disputes involving significant issues of public policy. 
As a topic of social-scientific research, implementation has 
received considerable attention of late. Beginning with Press-
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man and Wildavsky's seminal study, 10 social scientists have 
examined a host ofvariables theorized to influence implementa-
tion outcomes including resource, organizational, and political 
requirements. 
From these studies some agreement has arisen that the 
process simply involves too many variables to persist in the 
belief that lawmakers can unilaterally create policies which 
address all the relevant social, organizational, and political 
needs. 11 "The day is long gone," as Yudof observed, "when law-
yers and social scientists [could] assume that Court decisions 
and legislative and administrative rules automatically are 
translated into the desired action." 12 
While explanations of this breakdown between command 
and compliance abound, comparatively little has been said 
about the role of law and the legal system in the implementa-
tion equation. An exception is William Clune, who in the early 
1980s recognized implementation as a process of creating or 
attempting social change through law and widely ruminated on 
the consequences of the use of law for "social engineering."13 In 
a system traditionally characterized by the rigorous observation 
of predetermined legal standards, Clune is interested in what 
occurs when that conventional legal "rationality" collides with 
politically-charged social reform like Title IX. 
Clune discusses two related effects at length. The first is the 
inability of conventional legal rationality to adequately compre-
hend or resolve what are essentially public policy conflicts. The 
second involves the infusion of public policy discourse into the 
interpretation and enforcement of rights that which, unlike 
10. JEFFERY PRESSMAN & AARON WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION: HOW GREAT 
EXPECTATIONS IN WASHINGTON ARE DASHED IN OAKLAND, (1st ed., 1973). 
11. See MALCOLM GoGGIN, IMPLEMENTATION THEORY AND PRACTICE: TOWARD A 
THIRD GENERATION (1990). 
12. Mark Yudof, Implementation Theories and Desegregation Realities, 2 ALA. L. 
REV. 441, 443 (1981). He adds: "[t]he conflict between discretion and compliance with 
policies embodied in rules has been long recognized in the law. There are many 
similarities between jurisprudence and implementation theory as each seeks to 
unravel the complex relationship between coercive policies and rules and relatively 
autonomous decision making." !d. at 446. 
13. William H. Clune, III, A Political Model of Implementation and Implications 
of the Model for Public Policy, Research, and the Changing Roles of Law and 
Lawyers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 47, 51 (1983). 
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those in the private sector, "depend dramatically on the state 
rather than freedom from the state."14 
The legal system, Clune avers, is primarily responsible for 
the maintenance of the modern regulatory-welfare-state, an 
area in which issues oflaw and public policy are often inextrica-
ble. This responsibility, he argues, has precipitated a shift from 
the rigid "rule-orientation" of conventional legal rationality to a 
"reflexive rationality" which is more responsive to social and 
political input. 15 For the sake of social progress, in other words, 
Courts and bureaucrats, are more readily engaged in activities 
ordinarily regarded as the exclusive domain of the legislative 
bodies, such as evaluating competing social interests and the 
effects of policy. 16 
This "politicization" of public law, Clune argues, stems from 
the shortcomings of the political process itself. To negotiate 
that process, for instance, lawmakers must often resort to stat-
utory language which evades difficult, embedded issues. Com-
pounding this imprecision is the fact that whatever knowledge 
is available to legislators about the social problem they wish to 
address is typically deficient. The result is the generation of 
"socio-legal" mandates that are momentarily satisfactory to a 
group of politicians, yet fail to adequately comprehend either 
the problem or the effects of policy on the problem. 
Moreover, because common implementation chores like the 
interpretation, application, and enforcement of these directives 
provide a multitude of opportunities for interested parties to 
alter the enacted "political balance" (or the way in which com-
peting demands were originally compromised by legislators), 
efforts will inevitably be mounted to either restrict or expand 
the law's sphere of influence. Arguments that some aspect of 
the program imposes an unreasonable hardship or fails to ade-
quately advance the goals of the statute, for example, may ma-
terialize in the form of a lawsuit seeking to annul regulations 
and guidelines. 
14. ld. at 102-03. 
15. See id.; see also Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in 
Modern Law, 17 L. & Soc'Y REV. 239 (1983). 
16. See Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 
17 L. & Soc'y REV. 239 (1983);-see also Harold A. McDougall, Social Movements, Law, 
and Implementation: A Clinical Dimension for the New Legal Process, 75 CORNELL L. 
REV. 83 (1989). 
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Because such activities tend to elicit similar actions from 
those with conflicting interests and ideologies. Clune describes 
implementation as an "interactive" process in which "[a]ny 
given legal or political action may be met with a reaction by the 
organizations affected." 17 
Thus, a bill or a judicial decree introduced to enforce civil 
rights may be met with legislative initiatives designed to di-
lute or reinforce it. Regulations enacted under legislation may 
be met with political resistance and the regulations may be 
revoked. Enforcement measures such as threatened sanctions 
may be greeted with political backlash designed to produce a 
withdrawal of the threat, or with various organizational adap-
tations. . . . In a lawsuit, these efforts take the form of 
attempts to modify the decree or to obtain various remedial 
orders. In administrative practice, lobbying to strengthen or to 
weaken the underlying statute, administrative regulations, 
and practical administrative sanctions are common. 18 
Within a process bearing a resemblance to a military campaign, 
in other words, competing demands are constantly reasserted 
in the hope that objectives and standards will be modified. 
"When policy does grow in an orderly fashion," Clune asserts, 
"it is because struggles were resolved at a multitude of critical 
junctures in a manner at least reasonably consistent with the 
underlying purpose of the law." 19 
At the heart of Clune's "political model of implementation," 
therefore, is the proposition that political struggles over policy 
goals do not necessarily expire with the legislative process, but 
are exported to the implementation process where discretion is 
considerably decentralized and can be set in motion by inter-
ested parties on either side of the issues. This accessibility, he 
asserts, operates as a virtual assurance that organizations will 
confront one another in "legalized sectors of public policy," and 
that the progression from a statutory directive to the legal de-
tail of a functioning, regulatory framework will rarely be logical 
or tranquil. 20 Struggle, conflict, and compromise among con-
tending interest groups, in short, will ensure that policy goals 
17. Clune, supra note 13, at 56. 
18. Id. at 56-57. 
19. ld. at 57-58. 
20. See id. at 99. 
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and their associated costs are continuously revisited, accompa-
nied by the potential that the political balance of the program 
may be revised. 
Clune's assertions about the nature of implementation and 
public law, to summarize, stand in marked contrast to more 
conventional theories holding that implementation is (or should 
be) merely a ministerial process in which political determina-
tions of policy are faithfully carried out,21 as well as legal theory 
holding that the law and the legal system are (or should be) 
insulated from social and political influence.22 While acknowl-
edging that these conventional suppositions have some validity, 
Clune believes that the real and perceived effect of substantive 
social reforms on a host of interests makes implementation an 
inescapably political undertaking. 
In addition to supplying a conceptual framework for under-
standing implementation, Clune provides a great deal of practi-
cal guidance for those interested in examining the modification 
of legal objectives in implementation. Because the mandate is 
viewed as an "overture to a complex process of compromise and 
adjustment," in particular, he believes that an understanding of 
that political compromise, is the basis for comprehending later 
modifications, which are held to "proceed from the same 
source."23 The balance of this Article focuses on the history and 
structure of Title IX, information which, is in turn, is used to 
examine several significant adjustments in the program's gen-
21. See Daniel A Mazmanian & Paul A. Sabatier, The Conditions of Effective 
Implementation: A Guide to Accomplishing Policy Objectives, 5 POL'Y ANALYSIS 481 
(1979); GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, IMPLEMENTING PUBLIC POLICY (1980). 
22. See Isaac D. Balbus, Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the 
"Relative Autonomy" of the Law, 11 L. & Soc'y REV. 571 (1977). The distinction 
between traditional legal rationality and the "modern-public" rationality to which 
Clune ascribes lies in differing conceptions of the appropriate relationship of legal 
norms to society, and the conceptual apparatus used to sustain that relationship. 
Under traditional views, law is held to be authoritative because its norms, or moral 
and technical determinations, are insulated from social and political manipulation 
through the observation "rational formalities," including the strict application of 
posited legal rules and principles. 
This "autonomy" from politics, however, is criticized as the sources of the law's 
inability to respond to the evolution of social values. Relying on a body of legal 
professionals who employ "peculiarly legal reasoning to resolve specific conflicts," 
according to Clune and others, inhibits the flexibility and learning necessary to 
successfully administer socio-legal programs. Gunther Teubner, Substantive and 
Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 L. & Soc'y REV. 239 (1983). 
23. Clune, supra note 13, at 59, 83. 
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eral objectives as well as those which have occurred in the 
much narrower context of the regulation of intercollegiate ath-
letics. 
III. TITLE IX FORMATION 
The overarching aim of the women's groups, which, in the 
early 1970s coalesced into the "second women's movement," was 
to exploit the "full range of political tactics" to combat the use of 
gender classifications in laws and policies governing many as-
pects of social and economic life. 24 Lawsuits, for example, were 
initiated to pressure the federal courts to elevate the level of 
scrutiny applied to gender classification under equal protection 
analysis,25 and a major political campaign was mounted to se-
cure approval of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA?6-a con-
stitutional measure designed to prohibit the use of gender clas-
sifications in all but the most compelling circumstances. The 
legislative effort from which Title IX emerged, in other words, 
was but one aspect of a three-part strategy to produce a basis in 
the law for a "single, coherent theory of women's equality," and 
the sole component of that strategy which sought to take capi-
talize on the recent successes of the civil rights movement. 27 
As a contemporary and harmonious political objective, 
therefore, the ERA provides perhaps the clearest expression of 
the goals which prompted Representative Edith Green to intro-
duce an amendment in 1970 to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
(1964) designed to prohibit sex discrimination in all federally 
24. See ALBIE SACHS, & JOAN HOFF WILSON, A STUDY OF MALE BELIEFS AND 
LEGAL BIAS IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATE (1978); see also W. Douglas Gostain, 
& Anne N. Gostain, The Political Strategies of Social Movements: A Comparison of 
the Women's and Environmental Movements, 19 GONG. & THE PRESIDENCY 1 (1992). 
25. At the time, laws and policies differentiating between men and women, or 
"gender classifications" were sustained under equal protection analysis if they bore 
a reasonable relationship to some legitimate governmental objective. By contrast, laws 
and policies creating racial classifications had to be narrowly tailored to affect some 
compelling government interest. 
26. The Equal Rights Amendment provided that: "equality of right under the 
law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account 
of sex." H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Gong. (1971); S.J. Res. 8, 92d Gong. (1971). 
27. Barbara A. Brown, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for 
the Equal Rights of Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971). 
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assisted programs. Like the ERA, the proposed Title VI amend-
ment was opposed on the basis that it would engender an unde-
sirable level of equality between the sexes because in many 
aspects of social and economic life sex, it was widely regarded 
as a bona fide basis for differential treatment.28 Green re-
sponded in 1971 by introducing an independent provision lim-
ited to prohibiting sex discrimination in federally assisted edu-
cational programs and activities, with express exemptions for 
single-sex, military, and religious institutions.29 
In slightly altered form, this provision proved to be the sole 
success of the three-part strategy to effect change in federal law 
by members of the women's movement. But this success only 
distantly reflected the goal exhibited in the ERA of eradicating 
sex discrimination on the broadest possible scale. On one level, 
therefore, the movement's inability to emulate that policy (as 
well as the judiciary's continued resistance to elevating equal 
protection standards and the ultimate failure of ERA) can be 
understood as the result of an unwillingness on the part of law-
makers to treat sex discrimination like race discrimination. 
Nowhere was this unwillingness more apparent than in the 
effort to further qualify Title IX protection by exempting college 
and university admissions policies from the operation of the 
proposed legislation. In that instance, Republican lawmakers in 
the House of Representatives asserted that the imposition of 
federal control over admissions would "plant the seed of de-
struction for our system of higher education as we know it."30 
Enactment of Title [IX] would ... significantly weaken one of 
the great strengths of the American system of higher educa-
tion-diversity. Diversity in the types of educational institu-
tions affords more freedom to students, allowing each the 
opportunity to select the type of educational environment best 
suited to their individual needs, and encourages colleges to 
experiment and develop innovative programs. The imposition 
of a monolithic unity by federal statute would serve only to 
28. Minority groups already covered by Title VI were wary that banning sex 
discrimination under Title VI would create a political backlash threatening the source 
of their own protection. See Hearings before the Special Subcomm. on Educ. of the 
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 91st Cong., vols. 1 & 2 (1970) ("1970 House Hearing 
Report"). 
29. See id. 
30. 117 CONG. REC. 39,249 (1971). 
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homogenize campuses, a condition repugnant to the very na-
ture of higher education in this country and contrary to the 
best interests of the future generations of college students.31 
Although the proposed legislation sought only to eliminate the 
consideration of an applicant's sex rather than require institu-
tions to equalize numbers of male and female students, the 
rhetoric was enlarged to illustrate the potential erosion of insti-
tutional autonomy and academic freedom: 
Mr. Chairman, I offer this amendment to preserve the swiftly 
eroding rights of colleges and universities of America. We 
must view Title [IX] for what it plainly is, just one more giant 
step toward involvement by the Federal Government in the 
internal affairs of institutions of higher education. The con-
stant danger is that all too often federal involvement in the 
internal affairs of institutions is but the first step toward ulti-
mate Federal control.32 
Without the prompting of a change in constitutional law elevat-
ing gender to the same level of protection as race (e.g. ratifica-
tion of the ERA), Title IX opponents may have reasoned, there 
was little reason to abandon the longstanding tradition of defer-
ence to college and university discretion or to marginalize the 
academic freedoms acknowledged by the Supreme Court in 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire to include the "ability of the institu-
tion to determine for itself, on academic grounds . . . who may 
be admitted."33 
To such assertions, Title IX proponents responded that fed-
eral intervention in higher education for the purpose of pre-
venting discrimination was not an issue of first impression; 
Congress had enacted Title VI of the Civil Rights Act nearly a 
decade earlier to prohibit colleges and universities from dis-
criminating on the basis of race or nationality.34 Ultimately, 
however, many lawmakers apparently felt that sex discrimina-
tion was neither as serious nor pernicious as race discrimina-
tion, and adopted the amendment limiting Title IX's application 
to admissions.35 
31. ld. (remarks of Rep. Erlenborn) (emphasis added). 
32. 117 CONG. REC. 39,248 (1971). 
33. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (emphasis added). 
34. See 117 CONG. REC. 39,252 (1971). 
35. The 1972 House-Senate Conference Committee substituted a provision from 
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IV. MODIFICATION OF STANDARDS 
A. The Definition of Title IX Coverage 
The transition from Title IX's sparse language to a set of 
comprehensive regulations dealing with a variety of educational 
programs and activities involved a great deal of interpretation, 
a task which Congress expressly delegated to the Department 
of Health, Education and Welfare (DREW). The agency's draft 
regulations36 reveal that in the absence of more explicit statu-
tory direction and a shortage of case law dealing with sex dis-
crimination in education, DREW chose to give the statute a 
very broad interpretation, substantially expanding its coverage 
and the agency's own powers of enforcement. 
In a move that astonished many observers, for example, 
DREW abrogated perhaps the most significant of Title IX's 
limitations extending coverage from programs "receiving fed-
eral financial assistance" to those which, by institutional prox-
imity, were presumed to benefit indirectly from that assistance, 
and by defining "assistance" to include funds paid indirectly to 
institutions by student recipients of federal financial aid. 37 In 
this manner, the agency extended coverage to virtually every 
aspect of both public and private institutions, transforming 
Title IX jurisdiction from a narrow "program-specific" standard 
into a much broader "institutional" standard of coverage.38 
the Senate version of Title IX which, instead of exempting all admissions policies 
from coverage, exempted only private, undergraduate programs. See ANDREW FISHEL 
& JANICE POTTKER, NATIONAL POLITICS AND SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION (1977). 
36. Proposed Title IX Regulations, 39 Fed. Reg. 22,228-40 (1974). 
37. See id. at 22,236. 
38. Another important aspect of this interpretive exercise which helped furnish 
DREW's "institutional" vision of Title IX coverage was the assertion that federal 
assistance directed to a specific program could be terminated if it was used to support 
a discriminatory program within the same institution. See 39 Fed. Reg. 22,228 (1974). 
This assertion of remedial authority would enable the agency to more effectively 
enforce the regulations by penalizing programs in direct receipt of federal assistance 
for discrimination occurring in programs theoretically benefitting from that assistance. 
Critics of this expansion of the agency's powers, however, asserted that it contravened 
the express intent of the statute's enforcement provision which provides: 
Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected 
by ... the termination of or refusal to grant or continue assistance under such program 
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Notably, this modification of standards was not only 
grounded on the slimmest legal authority but involved a studi-
ous disregard of contradictory evidence and authority.39 In sup-
port of its "benefit theory" of coverage, for example, DHEW 
relied exclusively on Board of Public Instruction v. Finch, 40 a 
case arising under Title VI in which the Fifth Circuit remarked 
or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the 
record ... but such termination or refusal shall be limited to the particular political 
entity or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding has been mnde, 
and shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which 
such noncompliance has been so found . . 
20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1972) (emphasis added). 
39. Apart from inconsistency with the express language of Title IX there are at 
least three additional contradictions of which DHEW was aware. First, prior to 
enactment Congress specifically rejected language advancing institutional coverage, 
choosing to more closely tailor the statute to the limits of its own power to condition 
appropriations. 117 CONG. REC. 30,155-58 (1971). Second, the "maintenance of effort" 
requirements routinely attached to federal categorical aid (which ensure that federal 
funds supplement rather than supplant state or local funds) essentially make it illegal 
for institutions to use those funds to support other programs. See Comment, HEW's 
Regulation Under Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972: Ultra Vires 
Challenges 1976 BYU L. REV. 133-87 (1976); Janet Kuhn, Title IX: Employment and 
Athletics are Outside HEWs Jurisdiction, 65 GEO. L.J. 49, 71 (1976). And third, 
within the same ruling on which DHEW placed its sole reliance, Board of Public 
Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969), the court went on to state that 
the agency could not affect compliance by threatening a termination of funds without 
demonstrating that the program in direct receipt of funds was itself discriminatory. 
Equally compromising detail surrounded DHEW's decision to include federal 
student financial aid within the definition of "assistance," including the statement 
made prior to enactment by Title IX's Senate sponsor Birch Bayh that "[i]t is 
unquestionable in my judgement, that this would not be directed at specific assistance 
that was being received by individual students." 117 CONG. REC. 30,408 (1971). In the 
sole Title VI case authority cited by the agency in support of including student aid 
within the definition of assistance, Bob Jones University v. Johnson, 369 F. Supp. 597 
(1974) aff'd mem., No. 72-2164 (4th Cir. 1975), by contrast, the court made the specific 
determination that neither Title VI's language nor its legislative history revealed a 
congressional intent to exempt veterans' education benefits from coverage. Id. at 604. 
Further undermining the agency's position on these issues was uncertainty over 
the automatic application of precedents established under Title VI with regard to race 
discrimination, to sex discrimination under Title IX. See HEW's Regulation Under 
Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972: Ultra Vires Challenges. 1976 BYU 
L. REV. 133, 167-69. Although numerous references were made concerning the parallel 
nature of the two statutes prior to enactment, constitutional law differentiates 
treatment of race and sex classifications. See e.g. 117 CONG. REC. 39,098-99 (1971). 
A court, according to this analysis, would be justified in giving broader meaning to 
"federal assistance" under Title VI in order to "interdict constitutionally impermissible 
racial discrimination" than it would under Title IX where many sex-based 
classifications are constitutionally permissible. 1976 BYU L. REV., 133, 167. The 
unqualified adoption of Title VI precedent, in other words, would have an 
unwarranted, expansive effect on Title IX doctrine. 
40. 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969). 
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in dicta that virtually all programs within an institution benefit 
from federal assistance insofar as the introduction of federal 
monies "releases" institutional funds for other uses. Somehow 
eluding the agency's gaze, however, was the court's further 
statement that DHEW could not seek to affect compliance by 
terminating funds without first demonstrating that the pro-
gram in direct receipt of those funds was itself discriminatoryY 
Absent the power to enforce compliance in "benefitting" pro-
grams, any extension of coverage to those programs would nec-
essarily be meaningless. 
Because it was premised on such fragile authority, when 
finally exposed to searching legal scrutiny, DREW's "benefit 
theory" was eventually annulled by the Supreme Court in North 
Haven Board of Education v. Bell42 and Grove City College v. 
Bell, 43 which returned Title IX coverage to the program-specific 
standard suggested in the statute. However, because the 
agency had exported its institutional standard of coverage to 
several other programs in the intervening decade, the Court's 
invalidation of that standard had broad implications. For this 
reason, activists from an array of civil rights organizations 
banded to persuade Congress to overrule Grove City with the 
adoption of the Civil Rights Restoration Act (CRRA). In each of 
the programs effected by Grove City, the CRRA amended the 
definition of "program or activity" to include institutions.44 
B. Title IX Regulation of Athletics 
1. Administrative Action 
With the exception of the four-year period following Grove 
City (prior to enactment of the CRRA), "institutional" defini-
tions of Title IX coverage have had profound consequences for 
athletic programs, which according to critics, are neither direct 
recipients of federal assistance nor "educational" within the 
41. See id. at 1074. 
42. 456 U.S. 512 (1982). 
43. 465 U.S. 555 (1984). 
44. The Civil Rights Restoration Act broadened Title IX jurisdiction by 
redefining the term "program" to include: "all of the operations of ... a college, 
university or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of higher education." 
Pub. L. No. 100-259 (1988) codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988). 
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meaning of Title IX.45 Guided by an institutional theory of cov-
erage, however, DREW naturally regarded extracurricular 
programs including athletics as falling within Title IX coverage 
and promulgated specific regulations to govern them.46 
That action provoked a vigorous response in Congress. 
Amendments to Title IX.47 were introduced to exempt athletic 
programs either in whole or in part, for fear that a mandatory 
expansion of women's programs would divert resources from 
more visible and lucrative men's programs.48 The sole approved 
measure, the Javits Amendment,49 directed DREW to make 
"reasonable provisions considering the nature of particular 
sports," a compromise attempt to exempt "revenue-producing" 
sports programs which unwittingly reinforced DREW's basis 
for extending coverage to athletic programs in the first place. 
Congress, DREW Secretary Caspar Weinberger reasoned, 
would not have imposed a "reasonableness" standard unless it 
considered athletic programs to be covered by the statute. 5° 
Intercollegiate athletic programs, however, differ from other 
educational programs in ways that make them difficult targets 
of gender-based reform, including dangerous bodily contact in 
certain sports and an expectation of economic self-sufficiency at 
the departmental level.51 For this reason perhaps, DREW's 
proposed regulations sought to ensure equality of opportunity 
by simply equalizing participation; requiring institutions to 
undertake "affirmative efforts" in the form of additional train-
ing, support, and publicity to enable women to participate in 
greater numbers, and then to provide "athletic opportunities in 
45. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (1998). 
46. See Proposed Title IX Regulations, 39 Fed. Reg. 22,228-40 (1974). 
47. See 120 CONG. REC. 88488-89 (1974); 8. Con. Res. 52, 94th Cong., 121 CONG. 
REC., 812695 (1975) (statement by Sen. Laxaltl; H.R. Con. Res. 311, 94'h Cong., 121 
CONG. REC. H5636 (1975) (statement by Rep. Martin). 
48. See 121 CONG. REC. 22,778 (1975). 
49. The Javits amendment referred to in Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844 (1974) is 
now codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1998). 
50. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (1998). 
51. The use of separate men's and women's teams (an otherwise impermissible 
gender classification under Title IX) to ensure that women are not "effectively" 
excluded from participation by differences in size, experience and ability, for example, 
involves the duplication of a host of fixed costs such as coaching salaries, facilities 
and maintenance, in addition to increases in such regular operating expenses as 
travel and accommodation. See Mark H. Rettig, Note, Sex Discrimination and 
Intercollegiate Athletics, 61 IOWA L. REV. 420, 452-54 (1975). 
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such sports and through such teams as will most effectively 
equalize opportunities for members of both sexes."52 
While ease of administration certainly recommends that 
approach, requiring institutions to develop female interest in 
athletic participation also subtly shifts accountability from 
those factors within the control of institutions (i.e., number and 
quality of programs) to social factors largely beyond their con-
trol. From the 9700 comments, suggestions, and objections53 
elicited by these proposed requirements, accordingly, a decisive 
criticism emerged: by requiring institutions to increase female 
participation prior to any finding of discrimination by the insti-
tution, the requirements confused the concept of "equal opportu-
nity" with that of "affirmative action." 
Ultimately those criticisms and the clarity of the statute's 
injunction against the use of preferences to correct statistical 
imbalances54 forced DREW to not only withdraw the require-
ments, but to admit that they were inconsistent with the man-
date.55 The agency's final regulations consequently, seek to 
assess equal opportunity in athletic programming by reference 
to the accommodation of existing student interest, whether or 
not the results are statistically equivalent.56 
Of equal or greater importance, however, is the fact that 
under these final requirements the accommodation of student 
interest is relegated to the status of one of a host of factors 
referenced by the agency. In assessing compliance, the regula-
tions state that DREW will consider: 
(a) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition 
effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of the 
members of both sexes; (b) the provision of equipment and 
supplies; (c) scheduling of games and practice times; (d) travel 
and per diem expenses; (e) opportunity to receive coaching and 
academic tutoring; (f) assignment and compensation of 
coaches and tutors; (g) provision of locker rooms, practice and 
competitive facilities; (h) provision of medical and training 
52. Proposed Title IX Regulations, 39 Fed. Reg. 22,228-40 (1974). 
53. See 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975). 
54. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (1998). 
55. See 40 Fed. Reg. 24,134 (1975). 
56. See 40 Fed. Reg. 24,127 (1975). 
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facilities and services; (i) provision of housing and dining facil-
ities and services; and (j) publicity. 57 
An important consequence of assessing compliance by means 
other than exclusive reference to the accommodation of student 
interest is that institutions are able to retain greater control of 
programming decisions. 58 
Several years after Congress' reluctant approval of the final 
regulations,59 the Department of Education's Office for Civil 
Right ("OCR") issued the Policy Interpretation of Title IX and 
Intercollegiate Athletics ("Policy Interpretation"), an interpreta-
tion of Title XI which the same Congress would almost cer-
tainly have disapproved because it renewed the idea of equaliz-
ing participation.60 
In the document, OCR propels "effective accommodation of 
student interests and abilities" from a place of relative obscu-
rity to the status of one of three major compliance areas. The 
relevance ofthis change is readily apparent: effective accommo-
dation is elevated from at least a one-in-ten consideration un-
der the regulations to a one-in-three consideration. Further, 
because the agency failed to clarify whether the tests must be 
applied together for the purposes of establishing compliance or 
may be applied independently, effective accommodation can be 
understood as a "complete compliance section on its own."61 
The two other compliance areas sharing this status are equita-
57. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,134 (1975). 
58. It is important to note in this regard that the regulations explicitly reject 
equal aggregate expenditures on men's and women's teams as the test of compliance 
and instead simply obligate institutions to provide the funds "necessary" to ensure 
that the opportunities provided are of similar quality. 40 Fed. Reg. 21,143 § 86.41(c) 
(1975). 
59. Congress' "approval" actually took the form of the legislature's inability to 
pass a joint resolution disapproving of the regulations. The resolution was put 
forward by lawmakers who deemed DREW's interpretation of Title IX, particularly 
its interpretation of coverage, to be so aggressive as to be "ultra vires," or beyond the 
rulemaking authority of the agency. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (1998); see also Janet 
Kuhn, Title IX: Employment and Athletics are Outside HEW's Jurisdiction, 65 GEO. 
L.J. 49, 71 (1976). 
60. See 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415 (1979). OCR assumed responsibility for Title IX 
following the dissolution of DREW. 
61. Susan M. Shook, The Title IX Tug-of-War and Intercollegiate Athletics in the 
1990s: Nonrevenue Men's Team Join Women Athletes in the Scramble for Survival, 71 
IND. L.J. 773, 797 (1996). 
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ble distribution of athletic scholarships62 and "equivalence in 
other athletic benefits and opportunities" (e.g., travel and 
equipment).63 
The Policy Interpretation allows institutions to demon-
strate effective accommodation in three ways: (a) by showing 
that the rate of participation in athletic programs by members 
of the "under-represented sex" is substantially proportional to 
their rate of undergraduate enrollment, (b) by producing evi-
dence of a history and "continuing practice" of program develop-
ment for members of the under-represented sex, (c) or by pro-
ducing evidence that the existing program "fully and effectively" 
accommodates the interests and abilities of both sexes.64 In 
most instances, the Policy Interpretation indicates, meeting the 
effective accommodation requirement "will entail development 
of athletic programs that substantially expand opportunities for 
women to participate and compete at alllevels"-a result justi-
fied by "the discriminatory effects of the historic emphasis on 
men's intercollegiate sports" and the "nationally increasing 
levels ofwomen's interests and abilities."65 
62. Under a separate provision, the regulations seek to assure that scholarship 
funds are awarded in proportion to the numbers of men and women participating in 
athletics programs: "To the extent that a recipient awards athletic scholarships or 
grants-in-aid, it must provide reasonable opportunities for such awards for members 
of each sex in proportion to the number of students of each sex participating in 
intercollegiate sports." 34 C.F.R. § 1906.37(c). 
63. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415-17 (1979). 
64. See 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415-17 (1979). 
65. See 44 Fed. Reg. 74,414-19 (1979). Another important aspect of this 
mechanism is the treatment of student interest assessments that the regulations left 
for institutions to "consider by a reasonable means [they] deem appropriate." 40 Fed. 
Reg. 24,135 (1975). In a statement reminiscent of the "affirmative effort" requirements 
under the proposed regulations, the Policy Interpretation provides: 
Institutions may determine the athletic interests and abilities of students by 
nondiscriminatory methods of their choosing provided: [they] take into account the 
nationally increasing levels of women's interests and abilities ... do not disadvantage 
the members of an underrepresented sex . . . take into account team performance . . . 
f and] are responsive to the expressed interests of students capable of intercollegiate 
competition who are members of an underrepresented sex. 
44 Fed. Reg. 71,417 (1979). 
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2. Judicial Construction of Title IX 
a. Private Enforcement. Another major development coming 
only four years after approval of the regulations involved a 
ruling of the Supreme Court which made institutions much 
more vulnerable to challenge. In Cannon v. University of Chi-
cago, 66 the Court enabled individuals with complaints arising 
under Title IX to circumvent time-consuming administrative 
procedures by implying a private right of action. This move 
precipitated a flood of new litigation and essentially installed 
the courts as the primary enforcers of Title IX. 
Utilizing a four-part analysis developed four years earlier in 
Cort v. Ash,67 the Supreme Court determined that the purposes 
of Title IX, the legal context in which it was enacted, and the 
inadequacy of the statute's funding-termination remedy for 
redressing individual harm all suggested that Congress, despite 
of its silence on the issue, had contemplated enforcement of 
Title IX by private litigants. Justice Stevens, who authored the 
majority opinion, was particularly attentive to the fact that "in 
1972 when Title IX was enacted, the critical language in Title 
VI had already been construed as creating a private remedy."68 
"It is always appropriate," he reasoned in imputing an aware-
ness of those developments to the Congress, "to assume that 
our elected representatives, like other citizens, know the law."69 
Equally persuasive in the Court's view was the onerous 
burden of proof imposed on individuals to trigger the statutory 
remedy. "[I]t makes little sense to impose on an individual, 
whose only interest is in obtaining a benefit for herself ... the 
burden of demonstrating that an institution's practices are so 
pervasively discriminatory that a complete cutoff of federal 
66. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
67. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
68. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 697-98. Specifically, Justice 
Stevens cited Bossier Parish School Board v. Lemon 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967), 
adding that the case had been "repeatedly cited with approval and never questioned 
during the ensuing five years." Id. at 698. Equally persuasive in Steven's view, was 
the fact that Title IX was "enacted against a backdrop of three recently issued 
implied-cause-of-action decisions of this Court involving civil rights statutes with 
language similar to that in Title IX." Id. at 698 n.22 (citing Sullivan v. Little Hunting 
Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); and 
Jones v. Alfred H. Meyer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968)). 
69. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 698. 
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funding is appropriate."70 In such situations, the Court as-
serted, violations would be more efficiently remedied by a court 
ordered injunction, "requiring an institution to accept an appli-
cant who had been improperly excluded."71 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Powell chastened the ma-
jority for succumbing to the "temptation to lend its assistance to 
the furtherance of [a] remedial end deemed attractive.'m Jus-
tice Powell was particularly critical of the practice of implying 
private rights of action, something he viewed as a disturbing 
violation of the constitutional separation of powers because it 
allows the courts to essentially expand their own jurisdiction. 
"When Congress chooses not to provide a private civil remedy," 
he asserted, "federal courts should not assume the legislative 
role of creating such a remedy and thereby enlarge their juris-
diction.'173 In this instance, he continued, Title IX's legislative 
history is clear that "Congress deemed the administrative en-
forcement mechanism it did create fully adequate to protect 
Title IX rights."74 
Importantly, the installation of the federal courts as the 
arbiters of Title IX has tremendously accelerated the rate of 
policy development under the statute. A leading example is the 
70. !d. at 705. 
71. ld. 
72. ld. at 749. 
73. Id. at 731-32. Only a single aspect of the Court's four-part analysis, Powell 
observed, dealt with legislative intent, which he viewed as the only legitimate basis 
for implying a right of action, while the other three he characterized as invitations 
to judicial lawmaking. Powell's treatment of the three remaining Cort factors was 
couched less in the facts of Cannon than in his objections to the entire practice of 
implying rights of action. On this basis, his dissent in Cannon has been recognized 
as the "doctrinal foundation for the Court's [subsequent] retreat from the liberal 
implication doctrine" and as the "judicial birth of the New Erie doctrine" (i.e., the 
judicial policy of non-interference with the decisions committed by the Constitution 
to the other branches of government). Donald L. Doernberg, Juridical Chameleons in 
the 'New Erie' Canal, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 759, 766; see also Mark D. Loftis, Implied 
Rights of Action under Federal Statutes: The Continuing Influence of Justice Powell's 
Cannon Dissent, 5 J.L. & POL'V 349, 350 (1989). 
Powell took particular exception to that aspect of the Cart analysis calling for a 
judicial determination of the consistency of a private right of action with the 
"underlying purposes" of the legislative scheme because it "permits a court to decide 
for itself what the goals of a scheme should be, and how those goals should be 
advanced." Cannon, 441 U.S. at 741. Even if such invasions of the legislative 
prerogative could be construed as constitutional, he asserted, they should nevertheless 
be avoided because they encourage Congress to "shirk its constitutional obligation and 
leave the issue to the courts to decide." Cannon, 441 U.S. at 743. 
74. ld. at 730. 
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Court's decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County,75 which vali-
dated the use of compensatory damages to remedy individual 
harm arising from intentional violations ofTitle IX. 76 
Similarly, judicial cognizance of Title IX athletic regulations 
has rapidly evolved those requirements. The four cases re-
garded by proponents as the "jewels"77 of Title IX athletic case 
law, for example, (Cook v. Colgate University,78 Cohen v. Brown 
University,79 Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania,80 and 
Roberts v. Colorado State University 81 ) can all be traced directly 
to the Supreme Court's liberalization of Title IX enforcement .82 
Interestingly, in all but one of those cases (Cook), the courts 
accorded considerable deference to OCR's Policy Interpretation 
and its unpublished Investigator's Manual (1990). These docu-
ments, however, clearly raised as many questions as they have 
answered. Does, for example, OCR's renewed emphasis on 
equalizing participation as opposed to simply prohibiting dis-
crimination comport with the statute's goals? More specifically, 
75. 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
76. Following Cannon, courts struggled to resolve the Title IX grievances with 
which they were dealing in increasing numbers. After a period of uncertainty and 
reliance on injunctive remedies-which often led to the dismissal of lawsuits brought 
by students who had graduated by the time appeals were taken-that question was 
answered by the Supreme Court in Franklin (1992). Building on the private cause of 
action inferred in Cannon (and imputing a generally agreeable intent to Congress 
based on its actions following that decision), Franklin affirmed the power of the 
Federal courts to fashion any appropriate remedy, including monetary damages, to 
vindicate Title IX violations. 
77. These cases initiated the judicial trend of accommodating demands that 
institutions add new women's teams of reinstate discontinued teams in order to 
increase the proportion of female athletes. See William E. Thro & Brian A. Snow, 
Cohen v. Brown Univ. and the Future of Intercollegiate and Interscholastic Athletics, 
84 Eouc. L. REP. 611 (1993). 
78. 802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(holding that the university's decision to eliminate its women's softball team violated 
Title IX and ordering the program reinstated). 
79. The litigation generated four independent rulings: Cohen v. Brown Univ. 
(Cohen IJ, 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), aff'd (Cohen In 991 F.2d 888 (1'' Cir. 
1993), aff'd on remand, (Cohen IIn 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995), aff'd (Cohen IV) 
101 F.3d 155 (1'' Cir. 1996) and cert. denied 117 S. Ct. 1469 (1997). 
80. 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993). 
81. 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo. 1993), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 998 F.2d 
824 (lOth Cir., 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1983). 
82. See Diane Heckman, The Explosion of Title IX Legal Activity in 
Intercollegiate Athletics During 1992-93: Defining the "Equal Opportunity" Standard, 
1994 DET. C.L. REV. 953, 963. The number of decisions issued in six cases commenced 
in 1992, for example, exceeded the number of decision involving athletics rendered 
during the first 19 years of Title IX's existence. 
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does a test in which compliance is assessed by reference to sta-
tistical proportionality or demonstrated progress towards that 
goal conform with Title IX's ban on preferential treatment or 
equal protection guarantees?83 In each case, deferring to OCR's 
interpretive authority, the courts have answered those ques-
tions in the affirmative and clarified other issues of practical 
importance, including whether the effective accommodation 
analysis can be severed from the other major compliance areas 
(i.e.; distribution of scholarships and other material benefits of 
participation) for the purposes of determining compliance. 84 
b. Cohen v. Brown University: Construing ''Effective Accommo-
dation. " Of the cases construing OCR's "effective accommoda-
tion" analysis, the most illustrative,85 exhaustive,86 and 
dispositive was Cohen v. Brown University, 87 the class-action 
suit brought by female members of Brown University's volley-
ball and gymnastics teams after those teams, along with two 
men's teams, were demoted for budgetary reasons from varsity 
to club status in May of 1991. 
In the course of upholding OCR's effective accommodation 
analysis, the Cohen courts developed Title IX athletic policy by 
clarifying the three elements of the analysis, by deciding that 
"effective accommodation" itself is severable from the two other 
major areas of compliance for the purposes of establishing a 
violation of Title IX, and by unraveling an important challenge 
to the analysis. One striking aspect of these accomplishments 
83. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1998). 
84. See Heckman, supra note 82. Other issues clarified included how men's and 
women's programs should be compared and burdens of proof for each component of 
the three-pronged effective accommodation test. 
85. Cohen is most illustrative of the limits of the analysis because Brown 
University had made significant strides following the enactment of Title IX to 
increase and improve its athletic program for women and, at the time, had an equal 
number of men's and women's teams, and female athletic participation in excess of 
38% - considerably greater than that of most other institutions. See Thomas S. 
Evans, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: Primer on Current Legal Issues, 5 KAN. 
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 55-64 (1996). 
86. Cohen, to reiterate, involved two trials at the district court level, one on a 
preliminary injunction and another "on the merits," two appeals, and a petition for 
review by the Supreme Court. 
87. The litigation generated four independent rulings: Cohen v. Brown Univ. 
(Cohen 1), 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), aff'd (Cohen II) 991 F.2d 888 (1" Cir. 
1993), aff'd on remand, (Cohen liD 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995), a{f'd (Cohen M 
101 F.3d 155 (1'1 Cir. 1996) and cert. denied 117 S. Ct. 1469 (1997). 
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was the level of deference accorded to OCR's interpretation of 
the statute and regulations. In rejecting Brown's contention 
that the Policy Interpretation "goes so far afield that it counter-
vails the enabling legislation," the appellate court found the 
OCR document to be a "plausible" interpretation of the regula-
tion.88 The trial court noted moreover, that when the Civil 
Rights Restoration Act (1987) was enacted, Congress had the 
opportunity to disapprove of the Policy Interpretation and 
"chose instead to reaffirm its intent that Title IX's prohibition 
against sex discrimination be broadly construed. "89 
The question of severability, or whether a failing in any one 
of the Policy Interpretation's three major areas of compliance 
may constitute a Title IX violation, as the district court noted, 
was a decisive consideration because the claim against Brown 
University was based solely on an alleged violation of the effec-
tive accommodation component.90 To avoid such a ruling, the 
University argued that the Policy Interpretation and the Investi-
gator's Manual contain a "complex framework for assessing 
athletic programs as a whole" and that many more questions 
and factors would have to be addressed before establishing a 
Title IX violation.91 
88. The court stated in pertinent part: 
Whether Brown's concept [of the effective acconunodation analysis] might be thought more 
attractive, or whether we, if writing on a pristine page, would craft the regulation in a 
manner different than the agency, are not very important considerations. Because the 
agency's rendition stands upon a plausible, if not inevitable, reading of Title IX, we are 
obligated to enforce the regulation according to its tenor. 
Cohen v. Brown Univ. (Cohen[[), 991 F.2d 888, 899 (1993). The court drew its authority 
for this ruling from Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), 
a case in which the Supreme Court stated that a "court need not conclude that the agency 
construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold [it)." I d. at 843. 
Elsewhere the court noted: "Although [OCR] is not a party to this appeal, we must accord 
its interpretation of Title IX appreciable deference. The degree of deference is particularly 
high in the Title IX cases because Congress explicitly delegated to the agency the task of 
prescribing standards for athletic programs under Title IX." ld. at 895. Ironically, the 
court traced the source of OCR's "explicit delegation" to none other than the 1974 Javits 
Amendment to Title IX which was enacted to secure special treatment in the regulations 
for revenue-producing sports in the event that athletics might be covered by the pending 
regulations. See supra, note 49. 
89. 879 F. Supp. 185, 198 (D.R.I. 1995). 
90. See Cohen v. Brown Univ. (Cohen l), 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992). 
91. ld. at 987. The Investigator's Manual states: "[t]here is no rule or number 
of disparities that when reached constitutes a violation. Generally, the determination 
is whether, in reviewing the program as a whole the disparities add up to a denial 
of equal opportunity to athletes of one sex." 
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The court of appeals found both documents inconclusive and 
pointed to conflicting language in the Investigator's Manual, 
providing that investigations may be limited to less than all 
three of the major compliance areas. The court ruled that be-
cause participation controls access to all other benefits provided 
by athletic programs, the effective accommodation analysis 
could be severed from an overall determination of compliance. 
Equal opportunity to participate lies at the core of Title IX's 
purpose. Because the [effective accommodation analysis] de-
lineates this heartland, we agree that the district courts that 
have so ruled and hold that, with regard to the effective ac-
commodation of students' interests and abilities, an institu-
tion can violate Title IX even if it meets the "financial assis-
tance" and "athletic equivalence" standards. In other words, 
an institution that offers women a smaller number of athletic 
opportunities than the statute requires may not rectify that 
violation simply by lavishing more resources on those women 
or achieving equivalence in other respects.92 
Having concluded that effective accommodation was "the 
point of departure for evaluating compliance," the courts went 
on to apply the Policy Interpretation's three-pronged analysis to 
the facts presented,93 summarily noting that a thirteen point 
disparity between the percentage of women athletes and the 
percentage of women undergraduates at Brown failed to satisfy 
the first test of "substantial proportionality. "94 As a matter of 
law, the appellate court noted (Cohen II), "proportionality" fur-
nishes a 'safe harbor' from Title IX liability, and institutions 
not wishing to engage in extensive compliance analysis "may 
stay on the sunny side of Title IX simply by maintaining gender 
parity between its student body and its athletic lineup."95 
The second and third prongs of the effective accommodation 
analysis, "[a] history and practice of continuing program expan-
92. Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 897. 
93. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415-17 (1979). 
94. Cohen I, 809 F. Supp. at 991. The district court noted after remand that 
because satisfaction of the substantial proportionality test effectively terminates the 
entire analysis, as a practical matter, the standard must be stringent enough to 
effectuate the purposes of Title IX: "[t]hus, substantial proportionality is properly 
found only where the institution's intercollegiate athletic program mirrors the student 
enrollment as closely as possible." Cohen v. Brown Univ. (Cohen Ill), 879 F. Supp. 
185, 202 (D.R.I. 1995). 
95. Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 897-98. 
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sian" and "full and effective accommodation," according to the 
Cohen II appellate court, reflect "that there are circumstances 
under which, as a practical matter, something short of ... pro-
portionality is a satisfactory proxy for gender balance."96 In 
applying the second prong, however, the district court found 
that although Brown University had significantly increased 
opportunities for female athletes in the 1970's immediately 
after Title IX was enacted, a ten-year hiatus failed to demon-
strate a continuing practice of program expansion.97 
The third prong, the appellate court remarked in its first 
review of the case, "sets a high standard."98 "[I]t demands not 
merely some accommodation, but 'full and effective accommoda-
tion.' If there is sufficient interest and ability among members 
of the statistically underrepresented gender, not slaked by ex-
isting programs, an institution necessarily fails this prong of 
the test."99 In applying this final prong on remand (Cohen Ill), 
the district court found that the University's demotion of two 
women's teams in which "there is great interest and talent" was 
indicative of something less than full and effective accommoda-
tion. Subsequently, the court concluded that Brown was in vio-
lation of Title IX, and ordered the University to submit a com-
prehensive plan for achieving compliance. 100 
Brown appealed the Court's conclusion on both legal and 
empirical grounds. 101 The most important of its legal arguments 
involved the charge that the third prong of the analysis re-
quires an institution to accommodate every expression of stu-
dent interest "to the fullest extent until the substantial propor-
96. Id. at 898. 
97. See Cohen I, 809 F. Supp. at 991. 
98. Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 898. 
99. Id. 
100. See Cohen III, 879 F. Supp. at 211-12. 
101. In seeking review by the Supreme Court, for example, the University 
contested its condemnation under the third-prong of "full and effective 
accommodation" by producing evidence tending to show that Brown women were less 
interested in athletic participation than men. Over a four-year period, specifically 
Brown's survey of its applicants for admission revealed that women were far less 
interested in participating in competitive sports than men. The University also 
produced evidence that women's participation in college varsity sports nationally 
exceeds their participation in other college sports programs, such as club and 
intramural sports, and fell far short of the levels of participation by men in those 
activities. Appellant's Petition for Certiorari, 1996. This is the crux of the ongoing 
debate-whether colleges and universities should be accountable for culturally inspired 
differences in interest. 
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tionality of prong one is achieved," thus imposing "preferential 
or disparate treatment to members of one sex on account of [a 
statistical] imbalance" in contravention of both Title IX 
(§1681[b]) and the Equal Protection Clause.102 
The courts' response to this argument was most fully devel-
oped in the University's second appeal in 1996 (Cohen IV). 
There the First Circuit court stated emphatically that this "is 
not an affirmative action case. "103 With regard to the specific 
charge that the effective accommodation analysis mandates the 
use of gender-based preferences and quotas, the court ruled 
that because the analysis provides two ways to demonstrate 
compliance that are unrelated to proportionality, the analysis 
violates neither Title IX's own prohibition on preferential treat-
ment nor equal protection guarantees. "The question of sub-
stantial proportionality under the Policy Interpretation's three-
part test," the court asserted, "is merely the starting point for 
analysis, rather than the conclusion; a rebuttable presumption 
rather than an inflexible requirement."104 
On this occasion, however, the University was not alone in 
its belief that the different elements of the effective accommo-
dation analysis should be taken together, rather than viewed in 
isolation for the purposes of analysis under Title IX's ban on the 
use of preferences (§ 1681[b]) or equal protection doctrine, be-
cause a determination of noncompliance necessarily involves all 
three tests. In his dissenting opinion, for example, the chief 
judge of the First Circuit stated, "[i]n my view it is the result of 
the test, and not the number of steps involved, that should de-
termine if a quota system exists."105 While agreeing that "no 
aspect of the Title IX regime at issue ... mandates gender-
based preferences or quotas," Judge Torruella nevertheless 
argued that taken together the three prongs comprise "an affir-
mative action, quota-based scheme."106 
The majority claims that 'neither the Policy Interpretation nor 
the district court's interpretation of it mandates statistical 
balancing.' The logic of this position escapes me .... The first 
prong ... surely requires statistical balancing .... The second 
102. Cohen v. Brown Univ. (Cohen IVJ, 101 F.3d 155, 174-75 (1'' Cir. 1996). 
103. Id. at 169. 
104. Id. at 171. 
105. Id. at 196. 
106. Id. 
76 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [1999 
prong ... is essentially a test that requires the school to show 
that it is moving in the direction of satisfYing the first prong. 
Establishing that a school is moving inexorably closer to satis-
fying a requirement that demands statistical balancing can 
only be done by demonstrating an improvement in the statisti-
cal balance .... Finally, the third prong ... goes farther than 
the straightforward quota test of prong one . . . the unmet 
interests of the underrepresented sex must be completely 
accommodated before any of the interest of the 
overrepresented gender can be accommodated. 107 
Notably, in Pederson u. Louisiana State Uniuersity 108 a Loui-
siana district court gave effect to Judge Torruella's remarks 
when, on the belief that the interpretation of the effective ac-
commodation analysis in Cohen and Roberts advanced the use 
of prohibited preferences and quotas, the court refused to follow 
those decisions. In their acceptance of proportionality as an 
appropriate test of Title IX compliance, the court reasoned: 
[those cases] strongly rely on each other and on a stated ad-
ministrative deference .... However, the jurisprudential em-
phasis on numerical "proportionality" is not found within the 
statute or the regulations; rather, it is inferred from language 
in the Policy Interpretation and ignores other language within 
the Policy Interpretation and the statute which argues against 
such an inference. 109 
Finding that statistical tests of compliance run counter to 
the statutory objective acknowledged by the Supreme Court (in 
both Cannon and Franklin) of protecting individuals, rather 
than groups, from gender-based discrimination, and that pref-
erential treatment based on such tests is explicitly prohibited, 
the Pederson court concluded that the deference accorded by the 
courts Cohen and Roberts to OCR's Policy Interpretation was 
misplaced.110 
107. Id. 
108. 912 F. Supp 892 (M.D. La. 1996). 
109. Id. at 914. 
110. See id. at 913. The Court further stated: 
To accept the interpretation in Roberts, Cohen and Homer, and the argument made by 
defendants [LSU], one must assume that interest and ability to participate in sports is 
equal as between all men and women on all campuses. For instance, if a university has 
50% female students and 50% male students, the assumption, under this argument must 
follow that the same percentage of its male population as its female population has the 
ability to participate and the interest or desire to participate in sports at the same 
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V. DISCUSSION 
As Brown University discovered, Title IX athletic regulation 
now, more than ever, is an animal with teeth. Without any 
other prerequisite, an aggrieved student-athlete may initiate 
and maintain a lawsuit on the basis of an institutions' failure to 
achieve or maintain statistical proportionality; compensatory 
damages may be awarded to redress individual harm,; and 
court orders may be issued to expand offerings for women ath-
letes, coercing a redistribution of resources within athletic de-
partments. 
Whatever view one takes of this regulatory machinery and 
its relationship to Title IX, there is no evidence of an organized 
effort to deliver colleges and universities into the hands of fed-
eral bureaucrats, no furtive plot to deprive them of their auton-
omy or academic freedom. Having said that, the parallels be-
tween the existing requirements and the broader but non-ex-
plicit purposes of Title IX do lend themselves to a depiction of 
the agencies and courts struggling to cast- off the statute's ex-
press and implied limitations to achieve a different vision of 
gender-equality, particularly in the area of intercollegiate ath-
letics. The emphasis on statistical proportionality, in particular, 
can be viewed as a reflection of the belief, widely held among 
social reformers, that interest and ability follow opportunity. 
Based on the foregoing analysis it may be argued that the 
development Title IX policy generally, and Title IX athletic 
policy specifically, has paralleled two distinct disagreements or 
policy conflicts first encountered in the course of the statutue's 
formation. These policy conflicts can be loosely defined as "total 
versus qualified equality" and "equality versus autonomy." 
competitive level. A review of Roberts, Cohen and Horner finds no evidence to prove 
or disprove this assumption .... 
Without some basis for such a pivotal assumption, this Court is loathe to join others 
in creating the "safe harbor" or dispositive assumption for which defendants and 
plaintiffs argue. Rather, it seems much more logical that interest in participation and 
levels of ability to participate as percentages of the male and female populations will 
vary from campus to campus and region to region and will change with time. To 
assume, and thereby mandate, an unsupported and static determination of interest and 
ability as the cornerstone of the analysis can lead to unjust results. 
Id at 913-14. 
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A. Total Equality us Qualified Equality 
The struggle over the level of protection to be accorded sex 
discrimination was first evident in the attempt by women's 
groups to replicate federal policy regarding race discrimination 
through constitutional litigation, advancement of the ERA and 
in the initial stages of the legislative effort which led to the 
creation of Title IX itself. In each of those endeavors, propo-
nents advanced a "no exceptions" policy premised on the belief 
that sex, like race, is an immutable characteristic and there-
fore, an inequitable basis for differential treatment. 
But while Congress gave its reluctant approval to the ERA 
whose ratification by a majority of the states seemed distant 
and unlikely, it rejected the much more immediate prospect of 
regulating sex discrimination through a simple extension of 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act (1964). In so doing legislators 
Congress tacitly rejected the use of race policy as a benchmark 
for Title IX protection, choosing instead to honor the distinc-
tions between race and sex discrimination in constitutional law, 
and diverting Title IX from the path of "total equality" onto a 
path of "qualified equality." 
The second instance of this conflict involved the struggle, 
prior to enactment, over the exemption of undergraduate ad-
missions policies from Title IX coverage which proponents un-
derstood to be the lynchpin of Title IX protection inasmuch as 
the number of men and women admitted to college would have 
a direct bearing on the level of accommodation necessitated 
elsewhere. Based on the rejection of the amendment to Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act, however, arguments advanced by higher 
education leaders and their congressional allies bore the as-
sumption that Title IX was a "qualified" statement of nondis-
crimination policy, contemplated to accommodate the autonomy 
and academic judgement of colleges and universities. Legisla-
tors validated that assumption, in part, by agreeing to exempt 
the admissions policies ofthe more insular and tradition-bound 
private institutions. 
A third instance involved the attempts between 1973 and 
1975 to exempt revenue-producing sports from Title IX cover-
age, a move thought to be justified by the redistributive poten-
tial of the statute and regulations. While acknowledging the 
qualified nature of Title IX protection by adopting an amend-
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ment which insinuates a desire for special treatment, however, 
on this occasion Congress declined the invitation to further 
qualify that protection on the basis of conflicting economic pri-
orities. 
The final example of conflict over the total versus qualified 
nature of Title IX protection involved the question of causation 
visible in the shifting standards of accountability for differences 
in male and female interest in athletic participation. The earli-
est indication of tension in this area involved the inclusion 
within Title IX of a provision(§ 1681[b]) prohibiting the use of 
preferences to correct "statistical imbalances." There can be 
little doubt that this provision was intended included to abate 
the fear that Title IX would be used to create a new class of 
"entitlements," or an obligation on the part of institutions to 
redress the effects of societal forces on female participation in 
higher education. 111 
Notwithstanding that express limitation, the issue immedi-
ately surfaced in the first draft of DREW's athletic regulations 
which proposed the imposition of "affirmative efforts" to culti-
vate and then accommodate female interest in participation. 
Following a torrent of negative feedback and faced with the 
prospect of congressional review, however, the agency recanted 
and in its final regulations limited its concern to existing stu-
dent interest 
Clarifying the regulations five years later (1979), OCR re-
turned to the more aggressive approach, specifying that compli-
ance with the effective accommodation component of the regula-
tions would be assessed by reference to the proportionality of 
male and female participation in athletic programs to their 
respective rates of undergraduate enrollment and, failing that 
inquiry, demonstrations of either a history of program expan-
sion or "full and effective" accommodation of female interest in 
participation. 112 
The difference between ensuring equal opportunity and 
remedying the effects of societal discrimination under this 
"three-pronged" analysis, however, is not an intuitive one. Nev-
ertheless, in the Cohen series of cases the courts expended a 
great deal of energy attempting to make that distinction in 
111. See 117 CONG. REC. 5,813 (1972). 
112. See 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415-17 (1979). 
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order to avoid condemnation of the effective accommodation 
analysis under the statutory ban on preferences and statistical 
balancing. By holding that a failure of the first prong (propor-
tionality) alone is sufficient to establish a presumption of non-
compliance, moreover, the courts have succeeded in further 
shifting responsibility for societal influences on women's inter-
est in sports to colleges and universities. 113 That result is 
clearly more congruent with a doctrine of "total equality" than 
with the qualified form of equality actually enacted. 
B. Equality us. Autonomy 
Many of the competing demands put forward during Title IX 
implementation stemmed from the right perceived by institu-
tions to self-determination. Depending upon the context, this 
alleged prerogative was alternatively advanced as an essential 
element of the loosely acknowledged doctrine of institutional 
academic freedom, and as a logical and necessary extension of 
Congress' longstanding but informal policy of not interfering in 
college and university affairs. 
The specification of Title IX of jurisdiction provides the ear-
liest illustration ofthe conflict between the claims to self-deter-
mination and the statute's broader purpose of eliminating sex 
discrimination in education. In that instance, lawmakers re-
jected a Senate version of Title IX which would have extended 
coverage to institutional recipients of federal assistance, prefer-
ring to limit coverage to those individual programs and activi-
ties within institutions in direct receipt of funds. 114 To reinforce 
this limitation, a provision was inserted stating that the termi-
113. The amicus brief filed by sixty colleges and universities supports this 
conclusion: 
Contrary to the wording of Title IX which does no more than prohibit discrimination 
''on the basis of sex," the [analysis] virtually eliminates the requirement of causation, 
i.e. that the reason for the disparity be sex discrimination ... the only defenses are that 
a college or university has a history and continuing practice of program expansion for 
female athletes or that female athletes have been fully accommodated in the athletic 
program. These "defenses," however, are in effect nothing more than a recognition that 
Title IX compliance will take time .... The polestar of a violation remains the fact of 
a statistical disparity, regardless of cause. Under this definition of discrimination, the 
issue is not whether the abilities and/or interests of male and female athletes are equally 
accommodated but whether each group gets its quota of the available varsity positions 
as measured by their percentage in the student body. 
Brief of Sixty Colleges and Universities as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition, 1996. 
114. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1998). 
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nation of federal assistance shall be "limited in its effect to the 
particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompli-
ance has been so found." 115 This passage meant that only those 
programs in direct receipt of federal assistance could be penal-
ized for noncompliance. 
The second expression of this conflict involved Congress' 
exemption of the admissions policies of private institutions 
from the operation of Title IX. In that debate, conservative 
lawmakers asserted that the imposition of Title IX would erode 
the academic freedom of colleges and universities to set their 
own educational policy by dictating the "appropriate" ratio of 
men and women on campus. 116 Illustrating the divergence of 
opinion on this issue, Title IX proponents responded that dis-
guising gender bias as a component academic freedom not only 
failed to make it legitimate, but disparaged women and nulli-
fied the concepts of social responsibility, taxpayer equity, and 
civil rights. 117 
A third example involved DREW's interpretation of Title IX 
jurisdiction. A broad interpretation of coverage would vastly 
expand the agency's ability to combat discrimination. To accom-
plish that goal, DHEW sharply departed from a literal interpre-
tation of the statute. An examination of the legal reasoning 
employed to justify the expansion of coverage to "institutional" 
recipients of federal assistance imparts a definite sense of an 
agency attempting to "break out of the constraints" of an en-
acted compromise to strike a new balance between institutional 
interests in self-determination and its own the desire to eradi-
cate sex discrimination. 118 
When the issue was revisited in Grove City, the Supreme 
Court took a decidedly more formalistic approach, according 
greater weight to the legislative choice of language and history 
than to the desire for more effective regulation. With political 
support for more effective regulation mounting, however, Con-
gress ultimately intervened to realign the political balance be-
tween equality and autonomy119 to make institutional liability a 
115. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1998). 
116. 117 CONG. REC. 39,249 (1971). 
117. See id. 
118. See Clune, supra note 13. 
119. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259 codified as 20 
U.S.C. §§ 1681-1685 (1998). 
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permanent feature of Title IX and other anti-discrimination 
programs. 
Finally, there are the decisions in Cannon and Franklin 
where the Supreme Court liberally imputed intent to Congress 
to enhance Title IX enforcement by enabling individuals to 
enforce the statute by means of private lawsuits. Formerly, the 
statute's administrative enforcement mechanism combined 
with DREW's inability to discharge its responsibilities120 had 
operated as an effective safeguard of institutional autonomy. 
Following Cannon and Franklin, however, the political balance 
of the Title IX program tipped in favor of equality, rather than 
autonomy, as individuals with the assistance of the courts, 
were installed as the became the principal enforcers of Title 
IX-a result arguably at odds with the will of the legislature. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although the foregoing analysis was not meant to establish 
a discreet, causal connection between the policy conflicts en-
countered in the formation of Title IX and form or direction of 
the ensuing policy development, it does offer some general rein-
forcement of several of the assertions put forward in Clune's 
political model of implementation. 
One of those assertions is that legal objectives of a given 
implementation change when "[t]he priorities represented by 
the law enter a world with many other priorities."121 In the 
context of Title IX regulation of college sports, nothing could be 
clearer. From a highly confined expression of nondiscrimination 
policy, for example, jurisdictional standards were stretched to 
include athletics which, economically speaking, are quite re-
mote from the benefits of federal assistance. Further, rather 
than seeking to simply ensure nondiscrimination at the institu-
tional level, by encouraging institutions to equalize participa-
120. For a number of years prior to Cannon, OCR had never terminated 
assistance for a Title IX violation, and would issue a letter of compliance if 
institutions simply executed an "assurance" that they would come into compliance 
sometime in the future (an informal policy aired in the agency's proposed Policy 
Interpretation but removed from the final version). See Ellen Vargas, Franklin 
v.Gwinnett County Public Schools and its Impact on Title IX Enforcement, 19 J.C. & 
U.L. 373, 381 (1993). 
121. William Clune & M. Van Pelt, A Political Method of Evaluation: The 
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 and the Several Gaps of Gap 
Analysis, 48 J.L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 39 (1985). 
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tion the bureaucratic interpretation ofTitle IX upheld in Cohen 
is arguably more concerned with ameliorating societal attitudes 
about female participation in sports . 
How these changes came about is the question of greatest 
interest-and the one of greatest difficulty. An additional ambi-
tion of this Article, notwithstanding, has been to examine sev-
eral of the model's higher-order assertions: 1) that implementa-
tion is a "recursive" process in which changes in legal standards 
typically revolve around policy conflicts first encountered dur-
ing the formation of the mandate; 2) that the legal process of 
implementation makes discretion more accessible to special 
interests which may actually set decision making processes in 
motion; and 3) that the legal decision making occurring in im-
plementation is infused with public policy discourse (either 
explicit or implied). 
As to the claim of recursiveness, the preceding discussion 
illustrated that two very basic conflicts have had a durable 
effect on the development of Title IX policy: total versus quali-
fied equality and equality versus autonomy. The debate over 
equalizing participation consummated in Cohen for example, 
provides an illustration of the struggle over the identity of Title 
IX first witnessed in the formative effort to emulate race pol-
icy-whether, that is, the program would attempt to remedy sex 
discrimination and its effects or be limited to eradicating dis-
criminatory policies and practices within schools, colleges, and 
universities. 
Whether the history and analysis of Title IX implementa-
tion produced have shown that special interests held sway over 
legal outcomes is another matter of interpretation, but an intu-
itively more difficult one because much of the development 
which occurred emanated from a single source: DREW and its 
successor, OCR. In the majority of instances these agencies, 
rather than Congress or the courts, were the facilitators of 
change, as in the extension of Title IX coverage to indirect bene-
ficiaries of federal assistance and the invention of regulations 
and guidelines giving the program a more pronounced remedial 
focus. 122 
122. It is indicative of the agency's disposition towards the nondiscrimination 
purposes of Title IX, rather than the statute's recognition of competing institutional 
interests, that even when changing policy was not specifically within its control, it 
actively supported the expansion of those goals; as in Cannon where the agency 
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Although the agencies crowded the field, there are concrete 
examples of special interests using the different elements of 
government to respond to one another's actions in ways which 
precipitated changes in standards. Perhaps the most volatile of 
those interactions involved the definition of Title IX coverage. 
DREW's sympathetic interpretation of the statute's jurisdic-
tional limitations prompted efforts in Congress to renounce the 
agency's regulations as well as the initiation of lawsuits which 
ultimately implicated the Supreme Court and further action by 
Congress. A different but equally responsive pattern is visible 
in the later stages of implementation where OCR and the 
courts engaged in a "give-give" relationship, supporting one 
another's efforts to make substantial proportionality the 
measure of compliance. 
Finally, the "deconstruction" of several important develop-
ments conducted in this Article makes it supremely obvious 
that the legal decision-making which has occurred in the course 
of Title IX implementation has been infused with public policy 
discourse, the third of Clune's assertions. From a legal perspec-
tive, DREW's decision-making (which was almost uniformly 
more consistent with a desire for the most comprehensive and 
remedial provisions than with the limitations delineated in the 
mandate) can only be described as unconventional: in the sense 
that its actions and explanations gravitated toward the most 
aggressive and least supportive positions, and in the sense that 
its sympathy for the underlying purposes of the statute was 
almost candid. 
Although judicial decisions are more difficult to characterize 
because of the complexity of legal reasoning, it is possible to 
spot activism, even when it emanates from a body as legally 
accomplished as the Supreme Court. The Court's willingness to 
impute knowledge and decisions to Congress in the course of 
implying both a right of action and a damages remedy, for ex-
ample, impart an unmistakable sense of result-oriented juris-
prudence. Yet, from a public policy standpoint, those decisions 
make excellent sense. 
supplied the Court with its opinion that an implied right of action would neither 
conflict with Title IX's statutory enforcement mechanism nor interfere with its own 
efforts to effectuate the goals of the statute. 
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Many of the decisions examined in this Article, in fact, were 
plainly result-oriented, with legalistic detail provided more as 
an assertion of how the law might be developed to support a 
desired outcome than to demonstrate how the contemplated 
outcome actually squared with the mandate, legislative history, 
or the regulations. The reasoning employed by the different 
courts in Cohen to uphold OCR's effective accommodation anal-
ysis, and to sever the analysis from the other aspects of the 
regulation, is illustrative. There the courts summarily deferred 
to OCR's interpretative authority and then fiercely endeavored 
to distinguish the effective accommodation analysis in such a 
way that it could be rescued from Title IX's ban on preferences 
and statistical balancing. 
A few things seem clear from a simple reading of Title IX: it 
prohibits sex discrimination in those programs over which Con-
gress has direct control (owing to the receipt of federal assis-
tance); it is a qualified ban on sex discrimination (as it includes 
important exemptions and limitations); the use of preferences 
to correct statistical imbalances is forbidden; and enforcement 
is to be affected by administrative agencies primarily through 
the termination of funds. If these very literal translations of the 
statute can be characterized as the expectations shared at the 
outset of the program, this study has shown that these expecta-
tions, depending on one's perspective, have either been ex-
ceeded or ignored. 
Much of the potential for the invasion of institutional pre-
rogatives feared by institutions in the policy formation process, 
correspondingly, has been realized. Currently, colleges and 
universities face much greater exposure to Title IX regulation 
than presaged by the compromises reached during the statute's 
formation on the issues of coverage, enforcement, and remedial 
obligations. 
By today's standards, however, many of Title IX's limita-
tions seem anachronistic, and for many years frustrated the 
groundswell of political support for women's rights. As there-
sult of two decades of continuous interaction, on the other hand, 
the current regulatory framework, which Cohen helped to solid-
ify, is perhaps a more accurate reflection of societal norms re-
garding women's rights and the responsibility of social institu-
tions to effect social change. 
